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Abstract 
 
This study examines the extent to which Nigeria has benefited from its democratic experience 
since independence. Using simple descriptive statistics and data series from 1970 to 2009, 
the study showed that the trend in macroeconomic performance has not significantly 
improved. Indeed, the period of democratic regimes seemed more volatile than the other 
period of non democratic regimes. The policy inferences from this analysis are that there is 
more to socioeconomic development than the form of government. Unless those development 
enhancing factors are addressed, democracy may not lead to improved socioeconomic 
development in Nigeria.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The general opinion as supported by many of the reviewed literature shows that democracy is 
generally supportive of positive macroeconomic performance. As a result, most economies in 
the world now practice democracy as opposed to other non democratic systems of 
government. Democracy is a desirable system of governance all over the world. However, the 
experiences of many countries, developed and developing, has left many in doubt as to the 
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relevance of democracy to positive macroeconomic performance.  Before 1999, Nigeria has 
witnessed several distinctive episodes of both (mostly) autocratic and democratic governance 
since independence in 1960. As such the macroeconomic environment in the country has 
always remained the most affected by the diverse political systems adopted or forced on the 
people since independence. This has left scholars to wonder if political dispensation has any 
relevance to macroeconomic performance, or put directly, if democracy is a precondition for 
economic development. A plethora of works exist on governance and macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria. Opinions are however divided amongst scholars as to the adequacy 
or otherwise of the status of democracy as a precondition for positive macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria. There is yet any study to establish the position of political 
dispensation when it comes to the achievement of positive macroeconomic performance in 
Nigeria.  
 This study seeks to fill this gap by establishing solely on the basis of evidence which 
political system is on the overall beneficial to the Nigerian economy. The paper is divided 
into five sections. Section 1 introduces the work; section 2 review evidence from the existing 
studies across countries on the basis of which the study determines whether democracy and 
macroeconomic performance had moved in tandem in those countries or not. Section 3 
characterizes democratic experience across the world while section 4 assess the 
macroeconomic performance across different political dispensations and regimes in Nigeria. 
In this section also, attempts were made to analyze possible factors that might explain the 
different economic realities in Nigeria during different political dispensations. Section 5 
concludes with policy implications.  
 
2.0 Democratic Governance and Economic performance? Review of Empirical Evidence  
The development crisis in Africa has been described as a ―Crisis of governance‖ 
(World Bank, 1989). It also follows that while the reasons for South Asia‘s colossal human 
development are rooted in poor governance, the period of robust and rapid economic 
development growth in East Asia (Asian Tigers) is attributed to good governance. 
Governance has been defined as ―the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country‘s economic and social development‖ (World Bank, 1992; UNDP 1997; Olowu, 
2002). Political dispensation on the other hand is the system of governance that is in 
operation in a country at a particular period of time. Such dispensation could be democratic 
or autocratic. 
Political economic theory suggests that in general, democratic governance is a 
fundamental factor to effectively advance human development. However, a review of 
relevant empirical literature has shown that relationship between political dispensation, 
democracy or autocracy, and macroeconomic performance ranges from no relevance to 
detrimental or beneficial. In the works of Sirowy and Inkeles (1999) who reviewed fifteen 
empirical investigations, eleven showed either no relationship or a conditional relationship 
existed between democracy and economic growth.  Przeworski and Limongi (1993) reviewed 
eighteen studies and observed that eight established negative links, five positive links and 
five, no links. Nordhaus (1975), Olson (1982) Alesina and Rodrick (1994), and Keech (1995) 
also found a negative relationship between democracy and growth. Wittman (1989, 1995), 
Baba (1997), Lohmann (1999), however established a positive relationship between 
democracy and growth. In shaprp contrast with those who saw democracy as critical factors 
in promoting growth, Chani (2008) had found a positive relationship between autocracy and 
macroeconomic performance.  
Some early studies, such as Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) found 
statistically significant effects of measures of political freedom on growth. However, more 
recent studies have provided ambiguous results (see Helliwell, 1994; Przeworski and 
Limongi, 1993; and the survey by Brunetti, 1997). For instance, Barro (1996) concludes that 
the established links between democracy and growth are a result of the connections between 
democracy and other determinants of growth, such as human capital. Similarly, Rodrik 
(1997) concludes that, after controlling for other variables, ―there does not seem to be a 
strong, determinate relationship between democracy and growth.‖  
It is obvious from the above review that there is no clear cut direction on whether 
democracy hinder or promotes growth. Indeed, the body of evidence seems tilted towards a 
negative relationship. In view of this and the fact that most of these evidences are not based 
on Nigerian data, it is imperative to examine the Nigerian experience with respect to how 
democracy has related to economic performance over the years.  
 
3.0 Characterization of Democracy in the World 
Democracy is simply a system of government in which the principal positions of 
political power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections. Governance on the other 
hand is the exercise of power in the management of a country‘s resources. It is ―the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country‘s economic and social 
development.‖(World Bank1992; UNDP 1997; Olowu 2002). Governance draws attention to 
the public space or realm and its management. Democracy is always more difficult to define 
precisely because it means different things to different people. Although the notion of 
democratic governance evokes a clear and unambiguous meaning, in analytic terms, 
governance and democracy are distinct terms. However, it widely accepted that democratic 
governance which is largely characterized by high valued principles such as, Rule of Law, 
accountability, participation, transparency, and human and civil rights is in tandem with good 
governance. It is generally believed that democratic governance is a fundamental factor to 
effectively advance human development. The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed 
the greatest expansion of democracy in the history of the world. About three of every five 
independent states in the world are democracies today. Electoral democracy is now the 
predominant form of government in the world. Since 1995, however, the overall number of 
democracies in the world has remained more or less constant (particularly if we discount 
marginal and dubious cases of democratization). Transitions to democracy have been largely 
offset by reversions from democratic to authoritarian rule. Authoritarian regimes are not only 
increasing in number, they are also more confident and influential (Freedom House 2010). 
In its reach around the globe, democratization has been sweeping but far from 
universal. There remain significant regional disparities in the extent, depth, and stability of 
global democratization. The United States and Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, together 
with the 24 states of Western Europe (some quite small), are all stable, liberal democracies. 
Outside of Western Europe and the Anglophone states, liberal democracy is much more 
uneven and thinly rooted. Overall in Latin America and the Caribbean, about nine of every 
ten states are democratic, but only about half are liberal democracies. And a few, such as 
Argentina, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, have seen the quality of democracy deteriorate 
in recent years. Similarly, in the Asia-Pacific region overall, 22 of the 37 states (59%) are 
democracies and eleven states (30%) are liberal democracies. Of the 25 states of East and 
South Asia, only about 2 in 5 are democracies. Four of the world‘s five remaining communist 
regimes (China, Vietnam, Laos, and North Korea) are in this region, and other highly closed 
regimes (such as Burma) also persist. Among the 27 post communist states that were part of 
the former Soviet bloc, we find a similar pattern of divergence.  
The first group consists of the three Baltic states, which are more European in their 
outlook and pre-Soviet histories, and the twelve states of East Central Europe that were not 
part of the Soviet Union. Fourteen of these fifteen states are democratic (Bosnia is still an 
international protectorate), eleven of them are liberal democracies, and overall the region is 
moving steadily if still unevenly toward economic liberalization, democratic consolidation, 
and European integration. By contrast, of the remaining twelve states of the former Soviet 
Union, only three of these are counted as democracies, and three of these —Armenia, 
Georgia, and Ukraine—are only ambiguously so. In each case, electoral fraud and 
impediments to political pluralism and competition make it unclear whether it is really 
possible to change the national leadership through the electoral process. Russia is more 
clearly beyond this point, and so ―electoral authoritarian.‖ There are no liberal democracies 
among the post-Soviet states, and the general direction of freedom in this region is negative. 
In the 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa, democracies, or at least popular aspirations for 
and appreciation of the democratic form of government, are more prevalent than at any time 
since decolonization. However, many African regimes that are labeled as democracies are 
hollow and ambiguous, and many others stake a claim to democratic status that is manifestly 
false. Only two African states have been continuously democratic since independence, 
Mauritius and Botswana. Both have small populations (around two million or under), and 
both have achieved a pace of economic development that has eluded most other countries in 
the region. The most important liberal democracy in Africa is South Africa, which has so far 
sustained high levels of freedom despite political turbulence, economic hardship, and 
dominance by a single party. By contrast, Africa‘s other big states are all struggling 
politically.  
Of the principal regions of the world, the Middle East (including North Africa) is the 
one least hospitable to democracy at present. At most, only two of the 19 states in this broad 
region— Israel and Turkey—are democratic (and in Turkey, the military still exercises a veto 
on many important issues). None of the sixteen Arab states is a democracy, although several 
(Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco) have at least some degree of electoral competition and 
societal pluralism. Bahrain is gradually exploring a possible democratic opening. The only 
liberal democracy in the region is the only Western-oriented state, Israel, and there freedom 
has diminished in recent years under the stress of terrorism. 
 
4.0  Political Dispensation in Nigeria  
Owing to the nature of this study, the descriptive method of analysis is employed. 
Secondary data is generated on the macroeconomic variables of interest from the fiscal, 
financial, real, and external sectors during this period and presented in tables. A comparative 
analysis is then carried out on these variables within and between dispensations and 
appropriate conclusion is drawn on the basis of the results of the analysis. The period of 
analysis is divided into five dispensations with each having as many episodes as the number 
of regimes that operated during that dispensation. Specifically, we have the first republic 
(1960-1966), the first military dispensation (1966-1979), the second and third (aborted) 
republics (1979-1985), the second military dispensation (1983-1999), and the current 
democratic dispensation (1999-2010).  A critical examination of Nigeria‗s political history in 
the past five decades reveals that there has been a predominantly military rulership. The 
history is ridden with a spectrum of bad governance and leadership which is demonstrable in 
diverse forms and dimensions of authoritarian regimes, even under the guise of democracy. 
This is typical of the personalized character of African politics in which formal constitutions 
and organizations are subordinate to individual rulers.  
 
First Republic: 1960 to 1966 up to 1970 
This period witnessed two regimes headed by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Governor General 
from 1960 to 1963; and then as the Head of State when the country became a republic on 
October 1, 1963. This government was toppled through a coup d‘état which ushered in the 
first military government headed by General J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi on January 15, 1966. In 
July of the same year, a counter coup headed by General Yakubu Gowon was staged by the 
Northerners which ushered in the second military junta. In 1967, Gowon divided the hitherto 
four regions of the country into twelve states to allay the fears of the minority groups. This 
division however led to a 3-year long civil war that led to the destruction of many lives 
(estimated at 1 million) and several million worth of properties. The data for this period 1960 
to 1969 have been left out because no newly independent nation has absolute freedom to 
decide its economic direction; and  Nigeria though politically sovereign was still 
economically dependent during this period. Furthermore, the latter part of this period, 1967 to 
1970, was marred by the Nigerian Civil War.  
 
Military Dispensation: 1970 TO 1979 
The Gowon regime was in power until 1975. It is worthy of note that it‘s during this regime 
that many of Nigeria‘s major development programmes were undertaken in the name of 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-ridden areas. This period also saw the introduction of 
various forms of bursaries, scholarships, student loan schemes, etc.; a review programme for 
the improvement in salaries and wages, the Nigerianization decree, the change to Naira and 
Kobo, the change to the left-hand drive, etc. corruption was a major setback of the regime. In 
July 1975, another military regime headed by Brigadier General Murtala Ramat Muhammed 
and General Olusegun Obasanjo took over power. The Obasanjo administration willfully 
handed over power to a civilian regime, paving way for the second republic. (See table A.1 
for summary of macroeconomic performance during this period.) 
  
Second Republic: 1979 TO 1985 
 The second republic was short lived as a result of hunger, poverty and corruption that 
characterized the dispensation. The regime was deposed in 1983 by the third military regime 
headed by General Muhammadu Buhari. The Buhari regime (1983–85) identified indiscipline 
as the major problem of the country. It introduced War Against Indiscipline. It also 
introduced new press laws ostensibly to ensure a responsible national oriented press, different 
from the press that had basically served party, political and sectional interests. But the 
draconian press laws were actually an instrument for whipping the press into line and 
curtailing public criticisms of the regime. This regime too did not last as it was toppled in a 
bloodless coup d‘état headed by General Ibrahim Babangida which took place on August 27, 
1983. (See table A.2 for summary of macroeconomic performance during this period.) 
 
Second Military Dispensation: 1985 TO 1999 
Babangida cited the misuse of power, violations of Human Rights and failure of the 
government to deal with the country‘s deepening economic crisis as justifications for the 
takeover. He moved to restore press freedom and announced pay cuts for military, police, 
civil service, and then the private sector. Babangida‘s failure to fulfill his promise to return 
the country to civilian rule in 1990 (later postponed to 1993), and ultimately, his cancellation 
of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election which was generally believed to be the fairest in 
the country‘s electoral history led to his handing over to an interim government headed by 
Ernest Shonekan who was to rule until new elections in February, 1994. This was however 
not to be as the then defence minister, General Sanni Abacha forced the resignation of Ernest 
Shonekan, instituting another military regime. 
The Abacha regime was fraught with gross abuse of Human Rights, extra judicial 
killings, and corruption, leading to many sanctions from the International Community. 
However, Abacha‘s wish to convert himself to a civilian President in October 1998 could not 
materialize as death overcame him in June of the same year. He was replaced by General 
AbdulSalam Abubakar. Neither Abacha nor Abubakar lifted the decree suspending the 1979 
constitution. Both ruled through the Provisional Ruling Council which was the major 
decision making body during this period. In August 1998, Abubakar appointed Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct elections which ushered in Nigeria‘s 
Fourth Republic in 1999. (See table A.3 for summary of macroeconomic performance during 
this period.) 
 
Fourth Republic: 1999 TO DATE 
After 16 years of uninterrupted military rule, the country was relieved to be returned 
to democracy. The Obasanjo administration ruled for two consecutive terms. The major 
achievements of this administration included improved Human Rights practices, greater press 
freedom, reduced corruption, debt relief, and greater international recognition and support. Its 
major challenge was youth restiveness and communal violence. After it failed to secure the 
much craved third term, it conducted fresh elections in 2007, ushering in the late Alhaji Umar 
Musa Yar‘Adua as the new civilian President. Upon inception, Yar‘Adua proposed a 
government of national unity which led to the two opposition parties promising to join him. 
He was the first Nigerian President to publicly declare his assets. He overturned many 
unpopular decisions of his predecessor such as hike in petroleum product prices and VAT. He 
also achieved relative peace in the Niger Delta by giving the amnesty to the youths who 
agreed to disarm. He died on May 5, 2010 and has been succeeded by his vice, Dr. Goodluck 
Jonathan. (See table A.4 for summary of macroeconomic performance during this period.) 
 
Macroeconomic Performance by Political Regimes in Nigeria 
Table below presents a summary of average macroeconomic indicators during each political 
dispensation in Nigeria. Six variables were identified as measures of macroeconomic 
performance indicators. From the table it is obvious that fiscal imbalance is more pronounced 
in regime 5 and least in regime 1. For debt burden, it was heaviest in the democratic regime 
of 1999 to 2007. This coincides with the period Nigeria was classified as a highly indebted 
nation and given debt relief by Paris club. Economic growth, trade balance and inflation rate 
performed worst during the period of Abacha regime. The general observation from this 
casual analysis of these data is that macroeconomic variables were better in the democratic 
regimes than in the military regimes.  Table 1 presents summary statistics of macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria according to regimes while Table 2 and chart 1 both present the 
statistics in terms of military versus democracy. As earlier observed the democratic regimes 
are more macroeconomic performance friendly than the military regimes in Nigeria. 
 
However, if the analysis was done with respect to the personality involved. The data showed 
that some military government personality showed better economic performance than the 
democratically elected government. For instance Regime 9 was more fiscally discipline than 
regime 8. More interesting is the fact that the military regime of Regime 6 was the most 
fiscally discipline among all the regimes. In term of appetite to borrowing, the debt ratio was 
highest during the regime 8 than any other regimes whether military or civilians. Regime 3 
experienced the worse economic growth but relative higher during regime 8 and both are 
democratic governments. The external reserves depletion is a common trend in the 
democratic dispensation. In most of the democratic period the external reserves were lower 
than the periods of military era.  Clearly, the overall picture is that the type of the political 
personality in power also matter in the determining the direction of macroeconomic trends.   
 
Table 1: Political Regime and Selected macroeconomic performance in Nigeria 
 
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic performance in Military and Civilian Regimes in Nigeria 
 
  
FISCAL 
IMBALANCE 
 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT RATIO 
 
PER 
CAPITA 
REAL 
GROWTH 
 
TRADE BALANCE 
RATIO 
EXTERNAL 
RESERVES 
INFLATION 
RATE 
Military Era -2.68 0.82 -1.15 -1.96 2.33 23.62 
 
 
 
POLITICAL 
DISPENSATION 
 
 
 
 
DURATION 
 
 
 
FISCAL 
IMBALANCE 
 
 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT 
RATIO 
PER 
CAPITA 
GROWTH 
RATE OF 
REAL GDP 
 
 
TRADE 
BALANCE 
RATIO 
 
EXTERNAL 
RESERVES 
 
INFLATION 
RATE 
Regime 1 1970-1975 -0.683 0.04 5.98 3.67 2.15 14.28 
Regime 2 1976-1979 -2.7 0.03 0.86 2.5 0.17 16.25 
Regime 3 1980-1983 -2.05 0.04 -6.59 0.73 -0.12 15.42 
Regime 4 1984-1985 -2.1 0.08 -0.67 0.25 0.45 22.55 
Regime 5 1986-1993 -5.14 1.12 1.63 -0.78 1.16 27.12 
Regime 6 1994-1998 -1.38 2.20 -15.99 -15.04 0.69 35.52 
Regime 7 1998-1999 -3.3 2.03 -7.8 -8.4 0.41 10 
Regime 8 1999-2006 -2.22 6.72 8.85 3.2 0.42 11.75 
Regime 9 2007-2009 -1.74 0.77 5.23 0.48 0.05 12 
Civilian Era -2.1 4.15 4.22 2.17 0.23 12.76 
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One According to Hyden and Court (2002) there are six functional dimensions of 
governance which have implications on macroeconomic performance:  
(i)  The socializing dimension: This refers to the way rules are constituted to channel 
 participation in public affairs.  
(ii) The aggregating dimension, which refers to the ways a political system is organized 
 to facilitate and control the making of public policy.  
(iii) The Executive dimension: Governments do not just make policies. They are also 
 responsible for creating an environment in which people enjoy relative peace and 
 security.  
(iv)  The fourth dimension is the managerial dimension. Policy formulation and 
 implementation is expected to be people and result oriented. In other words, the idea
  that rules must be legal-national, formal and logical sometimes makes such rules and 
 policies to lack human face which should not necessarily follow in governance.  
(v) The fifth dimension is the regulatory dimension. It explains that in governance, state 
 institutions are often created to regulate the economy. That is, the norms and 
 institutions put in place to regulate how corporations operate as well as how capital 
 may be transferred and trade conducted are all important aspects of governance.  
(vi) The sixth and final dimension is the adjudicatory function. Here, each political system 
 develops its own structures for conflict and dispute resolution. How such institutions 
 operate has a great bearing on popular perceptions of regime performance.  
 
Problems of Governance 
Three generic problems of governance underlie and obstruct the consolidation of 
 democracy (Larry Diamond 2002).  
(i) The first and most urgent and pervasive problem is the weakness and frequent 
decay of the rule of law. In Nigeria, democracy is weak and insecure because 
political leaders lack sufficient democratic commitment—―political will‖—to 
build or maintain institutions that constrain their own power. And civil society 
is too weak, or too divided, to compel them to do so. The more endemic the 
problem of corruption, the more likely it is to be accompanied by other serious 
deficiencies in the rule of law: smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, 
personalization of power, and human rights abuses. 
 
(ii) The second broad source of malaise is economic. Economic reforms—insofar 
as they have even been implemented—have not yet generated rapid, 
sustainable economic growth in Nigeria. Economic growth is not rapid 
enough, and is not broadly distributed enough, to lift large segments of the 
population out of poverty or a very tenuous economic existence. The problem 
is compounded by extreme levels of inequality in income and wealth 
(especially, in rural areas, land). It is inconceivable that democracy can be 
consolidated in Nigeria unless substantial progress is made toward reduction 
of poverty and inequality. Between 1962 and 1985, Nigeria implemented four 
national development plans: (1962-1968), (1970-1974), (1975-1980), and 
(1981-1985). There was also (Anyanwu, et al 1997). These national plans 
either lacked proper cost-benefit analysis or were too ‗grandiose‘ to be 
realizable, partly because they were for the most part authored by foreigners. 
The first development plan (1962-1968), for instance, was described by 
colonial administrators who handed it down as ―series of projects which were 
not coordinated or related to any overall economic target.‖ The plan also 
lacked complete feasibility studies and proper evaluation of projects (Arthur 
Lewis). The necessary coordination and implementation of plans were also 
ignored. Some of these plans were squandered on prestigious projects such as 
FESTAC ‘77 while others were also affected by falling revenues from oil and 
increasing need for imported food as a result of delayed agricultural 
modernization.  
(iii) The third problem is the inability to manage ethnic, regional, and religious 
differences in a peaceful and inclusive way. Cultural diversity is not, in itself, 
an insurmountable obstacle to stable democracy. The problem arises when one 
ethnic or religious group seeks hegemony over others, or when some 
minorities perceive that they are being permanently and completely excluded 
from power, including any meaningful control of their own affairs. A major 
contributor to the unstable nature of Nigeria‘s political dispensation and hence 
underdevelopment during this period is communal and ethnic discontent and 
the ensuing conflicts which cause abrupt changes government expenditures, 
thus making the GDP to fluctuate greatly, compounding the already unstable 
political climate to cause the collapse of the economy as was witnessed in the 
late 1960s, late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 
These three problems—indeed, crises—of governance intensify and reinforce one 
another. The effort to build democracy in Nigeria, the most populous African country, 
is besieged by corruption, religious and ethnic violence, and a weak and fractious, and 
corrupt party system. Several regimes in Nigeria, both democratic and autocratic, 
have attempted to curb gross indiscipline and corruption and promote economic 
development. In spite of all these, the nation is still bedeviled by mass poverty and 
high income concentration among small groups of businessmen and politicians; 
unemployment and underemployment; lack of executive capacity; over dependence 
on petroleum and importation of goods and services; etc.. This is true irrespective of 
the political dispensation in the country.  
 
 
5.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The study has descriptively shows that democracy though may not yet be perfect is 
still better in term of aggregate macroeconomic performance in Nigeria. However, there are 
some impediments to the full realization of the benefits of democratic dispensation in 
Nigeria.  
The study finding is in contrast to what observed in the literature. In most of the literature 
review democracy was found to be less conducive to macroeconomic development. There 
many reasons why the result with Nigeria might be different. In most of the countries where 
non democratic regime thrives are in most cases are cultural homogenous and the traditional 
institutions are more institutional in the political structure. Africa remains an arena of highly 
contested forms of governance, where both democratic and autocratic institutions are weak, 
unstable and open to change. While a few African countries, such as Ghana and Mali, seem 
to be functioning reasonably well as democracies, most of Africa‘s new democracies and 
quasi democracies seem to be slipping backwards to less trusted autistic rule. Authoritarian 
regimes may randomly provide high-quality governance, but if they do not, they can only be 
changed by force, which may take years or decades longer than under democratic institutions. 
On the other side of the coin, a number of authors have noted that the proliferation of interest 
groups lobbying for power or for rents under democratic institutions may lead to policy 
gridlock, preventing the major decisions that are required in the development process. The 
most popular of those voicing this view is the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan 
Yew, who has argued that Singaporean growth –one of the most remarkable over the last 30 
years—would not have occurred without the stringent restrictions on political and civil rights 
under his regime. Also, as shown by Chani (2008), the Pakistani economy is one of those 
countries where autocracy has been more favourable to positive macroeconomic performance 
than democracy.  In cases where democracy is not associated with improved governance, it 
will have very little impact on growth. And in authoritarian countries where the quality of 
governance is high, growth is likely to also be at high levels.  
 In countries like Nigeria with several interest groups to balance, non democratic 
means of governance tends to lead to social unrest and chaos. This is in line with the evidence 
from other studies. For instance Francisco Rivera-Batiz (2002), also concluded that the 
introduction of democratic institutions in the form of more ample political rights, civil rights, 
and freedom of the press, among others, may or may not be associated with improved 
governance if the cultural setting is diverse and complex. The real question is the relative 
strength of these forces in the real world. However for democracy to positively affect the 
quality of governance, one key aspect of which is corruption, showing that the steady state 
rate of growth is determined by the economy‘s endowment of human capital plus a wide 
array of parameters that include, among others, the rate of time preference, the degree of 
corruption, and the productivity of human capital in generating inventions. This study 
therefore concluded that democracy is a key determinant of growth but only insofar as it is 
associated with improved governance.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1: Macroeconomic performance in Dispensation I (1970-1979) 
 
 
 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
 
FISCAL 
IMBAL
ANCE 
 
 
 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT 
BURDEN 
 
REAL 
GDP PER 
CAPITA 
GROWT
H RATE 
 
 
TRADE 
BALANCE 
RATIO 
 
EXTERNAL 
RESERVES 
 
INFLATION 
RATE 
1970 (10.0) 0.041479 21.64 1.0 -0.09 13.8 
1971 (2.6) 0.037854 11.12 1.0 0.26 16.0 
1972 (0.8) 0.054284 0.55 1.0 0.45 3.2 
1973 1.5 0.052147 2.47 2.0 0.26 5.4 
1974 9.8 0.020252 8.05 16.0 11.91 13.4 
1975 (2.0) 0.012877 -7.92 1.0 0.09 33.9 
1976 (4.0) 0.012852 5.93 -1.0 -0.10 21.2 
1977 (2.4) 0.011583 2.94 -2.0 -0.18 15.4 
1978 (7.8) 0.042862 -8.95 4.0 -0.50 16.6 
1979 3.4 0.05381 3.55 9.0 1.44 11.8 
TOTAL -14.9 0.34 39.38 32 13.54 150.7 
AVE -1.49 0.034 3.938 3.2 1.354 15.07 
 
Table A.2: Macroeconomic performance in Dispensation 2 (1980-1983) 
 
 
 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
 
FISCAL 
IMBAL
ANCE 
 
 
 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT 
BURDEN 
 
REAL 
GDP PER 
CAPITA 
GROWT
H RATE 
 
 
TRADE 
BALANCE 
RATIO 
 
EXTERNAL 
RESERVES 
 
INFLATION 
RATE 
1980 3.9 0.059176 1.03 5.0 0.79 9.9 
1981 (3.8) 0.011359 -15.80 -1.0 -0.55 20.9 
1982 (5.5) 0.044167 -3.35 -1.0 -0.58 7.7 
1983 (2.8) 0.056992 -8.25 -0.1 -0.14 23.2 
TOTAL -8.2 0.171694    -26.37 2.9 -0.48 61.7 
AVE -2.05 0.042924 -6.59 0.725 -0.12 15.425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Macroeconomic performance in Dispensation 3 (1984-1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REAL 
GDP PER 
 
 
TRADE 
  
  
YEAR 
FISCAL 
IMBAL
ANCE 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT 
BURDEN 
CAPITA 
GROWT
H RATE 
BALANCE 
RATIO EXTERNAL 
RESERVES 
INFLATION 
RATE 
1984 (2.1) 0.080674 -7.75 0.3 0.46 39.6 
1985 (2.1) 0.086057 6.41 0.2 0.43 5.5 
1986 (5.7) 0.201253 -0.50 -0.3 1.19 5.4 
1987 (2.9) 0.492119 -3.59 0.1 0.29 10.2 
1988 (4.4) 0.609237 6.78 -1.1 -0.30 38.3 
1989 (3.7) 1.015478 4.17 2.0 3.11 40.9 
1990 (4.4) 1.116107 5.15 6.1 1.60 7.5 
1991 (6.2) 1.237678 1.82 2.0 0.27 13.0 
1992 (4.3) 2.005649 -0.01 -19.0 -0.68 44.5 
1993 (9.5) 2.30374 -0.73 4.0 3.80 57.2 
1994 (4.8) 2.355461 -2.79 -12.0 -0.55 57.0 
1995 0.5 2.54743 -0.51 -55.0 0.32 72.8 
1996 0.8 2.101548 1.37 -0.01 3.32 29.3 
1997 (0.1) 1.973138 -0.06 0.2 0.50 8.5 
1998 (3.3) 2.036144 -078 -8.4 -0.14 10.0 
TOTAL -52.2 20.16171 -68.24 -80.91 13.62 439.7 
AVE -3.48 1.3441142 -4.549  -5.394 0.98 29.3133 
 
  
Table A.4: Macroeconomic performance in Dispensation 4 (1999-2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
 
FISCAL 
IMBAL
ANCE 
 
 
 
EXTERNAL 
DEBT 
BURDEN 
 
REAL 
GDP PER 
CAPITA 
GROWT
H RATE 
 
 
TRADE 
BALANCE 
RATIO 
 
EXTERNAL 
RESERVES 
 
INFLATION 
RATE 
1999 (5.9) 8.25596 -1.42 -10.2 0.41 6.6 
2000 (1.5) 9.409429 1.75 6.9 0.99 6.9 
2001 (3.1) 8.897317 1.72 6.4 0.08 18.9  
2002 (3.8) 9.078608 -0.05 -7.1 -0.14 12.9 
2003 (2.0) 9.378052 21.7 -1.6 0.05 14.0 
2004 (1.5) 9.269317 17.9 9.7 1.33 15.0 
2005 (1.1) 4.796088 15.5 10.0 0.55 17.9 
2006 (0.5) 0.757713 15.4 9.8 0.46 8.2 
2007 (0.6) 0.679667 7.17 4.9 0.078 5.4 
2008 (0.2) 0.733678 5.40 0.8 0.16 11.6 
2009 (3.28) 0.823546 5.05 0.15 -0.10 12.4 
TOTAL -23.48 62.07938 89.67 29.75 3.87 129.8 
AVE -2.13 5.64358 9.88 2.70 0.35 11.8 
 
